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Abstract 
This paper presents an overview of the greenhouse-gas emissions scenarios developed 
as part of an institute-wide collaborative effort within IIASA’s Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (GGI). The interdisciplinary research effort within GGI links all major 
research programs of IIASA dealing with climate change related research areas 
including population, energy, technology, forestry, as well as land-use changes and 
agriculture. GGI’s research includes both basic as well as applied, policy-relevant 
research, aiming to assess conditions, uncertainties, impacts as well as policy 
frameworks for addressing climate stabilization both from a near-term as well as long-
term perspective. 
We first describe the motivation behind this scenario exercise and introduce the main 
scenario features and characteristics in both qualitative as well as quantitative terms. 
Altogether we analyze three “baseline” scenarios of different socio-economic and 
technological developments which are assumed not to include any explicit climate 
policies. We then impose a range of climate stabilization targets on these baseline 
scenarios and analyze in detail feasibility, costs and uncertainties of meeting a range of 
different climate stabilization targets in accordance with the Article 2 of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992). The scenarios 
were developed by the IIASA Integrated Assessment Modeling Framework that 
encompasses detailed representations of the principal greenhouse gas emitting (GHG) 
sectors ― energy, industry, agriculture, and forestry.  Main analytical findings from our 
analysis focus on the implications of salient uncertainties (associated with scenario 
baselines and stabilization targets), on feasibility and costs of climate stabilization 
efforts and on the choice of appropriate portfolios of emissions abatement measures. We 
further analyze individual technological options with regards to their aggregated 
cumulative contribution toward emissions mitigation during the 21st century as well as 
their deployment over time. Our results illustrate that the energy sector will remain by 
far the largest source of GHG emissions and hence remain the prime target of emission 
reduction. Ultimately, this may lead to a complete restructuring of the global energy 
system. Climate mitigation could also significantly change the relative economics of 
traditional versus new, more climate friendly products and services. This is especially 
the case with the energy system that accounts for the largest share of emissions 
reductions, but is also the case in land use patterns where emissions reduction and sink 
enhancement measures are more modest. 
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IIASA Greenhouse Gas Initiative (GGI) 
Long-term Emissions and Climate Stabilization Scenarios 
K. Riahi, A. Grubler, N. Nakicenovic  
1 Introduction 
Svante Arrhenius published his seminal classic “On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in 
the Air upon the Temperature on the Ground” more than a hundred years ago in 1896. 
This first and today still surprisingly accurate scientific quantification of the 
temperature effects of rising CO2 concentrations included a sensitivity analysis to 
explore the effects of rising CO2 concentrations by a factor between one to three above 
the then prevailing level of some 300 ppmv. While noting that the burning of some 500 
million tons of coal was the anthropogenic source equivalent of a natural CO2 sink in 
form of rock weathering, the likelihood of quickly reaching any of the levels of 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations addressed in his calculation seemed rather slim from 
the perspective of the day. 
Today’s situation is fundamentally different. Atmospheric CO2 concentration have risen 
to some 380 ppmv and by simply extrapolating historical growth rates (which is widely 
considered bad practice not only in climate science) it becomes apparent that over the 
next 100 years we could approach those levels of CO2 concentrations that were 
considered in Arrhenius’ calculations of temperature effects, i.e. enter a regime of 
significant alterations of the Earth’s climate characterized by the proverbial “doubling” 
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations over pre-industrial times. Given the enormous 
changes over the last century and vast potential for further changes in the next, there is 
thus a deep interest to better understand unfolding of future emissions paths. Such a 
look into the future is especially interesting because it can help: 
a) anticipate magnitudes of possible climate changes; 
b) assess economic, social and ecological consequences of such changes; and 
c) determine if and by how much undesirable consequences can be mitigated either 
in better adapting to a changing climate or in avoiding unfolding climate change 
as much as possible, i.e. through emissions reduction. 
Above considerations constitute the prime motivation for developing scenarios, i.e. 
stories and quantifications of how possible developments could unfold that can help in 
our desire to anticipate potential consequences and to plan to mitigate this large scale 
planetary geo-physical “experiment” which we are in the midst of performing. 
Ironically, despite all progress in science and technology since the time of Arrhenius, 
one challenge remains as large as it was hundred years ago: the need to consider a time 
scale of a century (or even longer), which is dictated by the twin inertias of the coupled 
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socio-economic and climate systems. Given our current understanding of the carbon 
cycle, CO2 emitted today will remain in the atmosphere many decades to come, altering 
future climate, whose legacy, e.g. in form of thermal expansion of oceans and resulting 
sea level rise, might even take a millennium to fully unfold. Likewise, given the 
longevity of infrastructures and the capital stock of our energy system, many decades 
will pass before initiated policy changes will translate into a noticeable effect on 
emissions and hence avoidance of “dangerous interference in the climate system”, 
which is the stated objective of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCC, 1992), a convention ratified by most of the planet (much different to the 
ensuing Kyoto Protocol that only applies to industrialized countries and which the USA 
and Australia have refused to ratify).  
The task ahead of anticipating possible developments over a time frame as 
“ridiculously” long as a century is wrought with difficulties. Particularly readers of this 
Journal will have sympathy for the difficulties trying to capture social and technological 
changes over such a long time frame. One wonders how Arrhenius’ scenario of the 
world in 1996 would have looked like, perhaps filled with just more of the same of his 
time, geopolitically, socially, technologically. Would he have considered that 100 years 
later backward and colonially exploited China would be in the process of surpassing the 
United Kingdom’s economic output, eventually even that of all of Europe or the US?; 
the existence of a highly productive economy within a social welfare state in his home 
country Sweden elevating the rural and urban poor to unimaginable levels of personal 
affluence, consumption, and free time?; the complete obsolescence of the dominant 
technology cluster of the day: coal fired steam engines? How he would have factored in 
the possibility of the emergence of new technologies especially in view of Lord 
Kelvin’s sobering “conclusion” of 1895 that “heavier-than-air flying machines are 
impossible”? 
We do not know, as Arrhenius, perhaps wisely, refrained from a look into the future to 
check over which time horizon his model calculations could become a reality. We do 
know however that, like at the time of Arrhenius, a perspective of hundred years 
represents such a challenge that traditional (deterministic) forecasting is impossible. 
Instead our ability to anticipate, to imagine, to describe the deep uncertainties 
surrounding a hundred year future perspective is challenged, a challenge traditionally 
addressed through the development of alternative scenarios, or ranges of possible 
futures. 
As a result, development of long-term scenarios in conjunction with climate change 
science and policy analysis has both a distinguished tradition and has grown almost into 
an industry of its own. First reviews of the resulting scenario literature date back to the 
early 1980s (Ausubel and Nordhaus, 1983) and have been repeated periodically ever 
since (Alcamo et al., 1995, Nakicenovic et al., 1998). The latter review surveyed 
altogether more than 400 scenarios, which required the use of data base management 
tools to handle the large number of scenarios published in the literature. An update of 
that review for the forthcoming 4th IPCC assessment report will include altogether over 
700 scenarios (Nakicenovic et al., 2006). A distinguishing feature of the climate change 
scenario literature (including the present study) is a customary distinction between “no 
controls” or “baseline” scenarios as well as so-called “intervention” or climate policy 
scenarios that analyze various target levels in response to the stated UNFCC objective 
of "stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
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prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." In other words, 
it has become customary to distinguish between two major types of uncertainties of the 
future: uncertainties in emission drivers (population, income, technology, diets, etc.) 
and their resulting emissions outcomes (magnitude of projected climate change 
uncertainty), as well as the uncertainty surrounding levels, commitment and 
effectiveness of globally coordinated policy efforts to slow or halt global warming 
(often referred to as “target uncertainty”). Readers should be aware that the two types of 
scenarios serve different purposes and are not always to be judged with the same 
qualitative yardstick typically applied to a scenario (reproducibility, plausibility, 
internal consistency, etc.). “Baseline” scenarios –even if ranging in degree of 
complexity and logic from “blind” trend extrapolation to sophisticated blends of 
qualitative and quantitative scenario “storylines” that attempt to check for plausibility 
and internal consistency of the scenario(s) under consideration with the help of 
sophisticated models— aim to “stand on their own feet” in providing a “narrative”, or a 
sequence of carefully crafted conditional “when if, then” statements that when 
quantified with formal models lead to quantifications of different emission drivers, their 
interaction, and resulting emission outcomes. Conversely, “control” (or “stabilization”) 
scenarios are more controlled model experiments based (one is almost attempted to say 
“tacked on”) given baseline scenarios for a range of climate stabilization targets, that 
while being technically feasible may not necessarily also meet the same criteria of 
scenario plausibility and consistency as applied to the corresponding original “baseline” 
scenarios.  
The scenarios considered here are no exception to above described climate change 
scenario dichotomy. We also first proceed in developing and presenting a range of three 
“baseline” scenarios with the aim of elucidating the major salient uncertainties in 
drivers and resulting emission outcomes a century-long perspective necessarily entails. 
These three scenarios are then used as input to a number of controlled model 
experiments (altogether 11 “stabilization scenarios” imposed on the three baseline 
scenarios) in which exogenously pre-specified climate stabilization targets (represented 
by their equivalent CO2 concentration levels or more precisely by stabilization of 
radiative forcing of all GHGs) are examined from a multi-gas and multi-sector 
perspective. In other words, the customary almost exclusive focus on energy-related 
CO2 emissions in both baseline and “policy” scenarios is replaced here by a much wider 
analytical framework that covers all relevant greenhouse gases and all major emitting 
sectors. 
The scenarios presented here also do not emerge ex nihilo. Instead, they are derivatives 
of (a subset of) scenarios developed by the authors for the IPCC Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES, Nakicenovic et al., 2000) that were also used for a 
subsequent analysis of the feasibility of meeting a range of climate stabilization targets 
analyzed in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR, Metz et al., 2001) and within the 
model-intercomparison research performed under the auspices of the Energy Modeling 
Forum (EMF) (cf. e.g. Rao and Riahi, 2006). We have revised the original scenarios to 
reflect new information and to incorporate the results of scenario analyses performed 
with the help of the integrated modeling and assessment framework presented in more 
detail below with the aim to improve scenario consistency. One scenario (labeled as 
“revised SRES A2“ scenario or “A2r”), while maintaining is main structural and 
qualitative characteristics, represents a major numerical revision, reflecting the most 
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recent long-term demographic outlook with a corresponding lowering of future world 
population growth (O’Neill et al., 2005). 
The main objective of our scenario exercise is to explore feasibility and costs of meeting 
alternative climate stabilization targets under a range of salient long-term uncertainties 
with a limited set of scenarios. In order to meet that objective we have developed two 
contrasting scenarios A2r and B1 that aim to bracket the upper and lower quadrants of 
emissions and hence magnitude of climate change and of possible vulnerability to 
climate change respectively. These two scenarios form also the backbone of the 
integration of the energy sector, agriculture and forest sector model linkages reported 
here. The more intermediary scenario B2 (whose revisions compared to its SRES 
variant are numerically minor) serves as a benchmark for comparison of the results 
presented here to earlier work in particular that of the IPCC SRES and TAR reports, as 
well as to earlier scenarios (in particular the scenario IIASA-WEC “B”) developed in 
collaboration between IIASA and the World Energy Council (WEC), Nakicenovic et al., 
1998, Grubler et al., 1996). In view of resource constraints we have not performed a 
detailed agricultural and forestry model analysis for this intermediary scenario B2 and 
will report results in due course. 
It should be noted that the use of the term of upper and lower “quadrants” to position 
the scenarios reported here in comparison to the entire scenario literature is indicative 
only. The scenarios developed aim to be positioned above/below the 75th and 25th 
percentile of the comparable scenario literature, without however necessarily always 
falling with all1 their salient scenario parameters within this indicative range. Readers 
should also be alerted that above quantitative yardstick from a statistical analysis of the 
frequency distribution of the published scenario literature should not be confounded 
with the traditional concept of probability. Given the large number of variables and their 
interdependence, we continue to be of the opinion that it is impossible to assign 
subjective statements on likelihood of occurrence to emission scenarios. Likelihoods or 
probabilities are therefore not assigned to any of the scenarios reported here, which does 
not mean that we consider all scenarios equally likely. In fact we do not consider the 
three scenarios reported here equally likely, but simply cannot offer any scientifically 
rigorous way of differentiating likelihoods across the scenarios and therefore refrain 
from any necessarily arbitrary, subjective ranking. 
Table 1 summarizes the positioning of the three scenarios with respect to the most 
important uncertainties examined in this study. These include in particular: 
Development pathway uncertainty including alternative demographic, economic, as well 
as technological developments that lead alternatively to high (A2r), intermediary (B2), 
or low (B1) emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and hence magnitude of future 
climate change.  
Climate impacts vulnerability uncertainty whose multiple dimensions that in particular 
include also “soft” institutional and technological variables are treated here in a 
                                                 
1 Given variable interdependence this would in fact be a mathematical impossibility. A scenario in which 
all salient input parameters would e.g. be positioned at the 90th percentile of the corresponding scenario 
literature not only would not yield a logical and plausible scenario it also would not fall on the 90th 
percentile of resulting emissions. 
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simplified manner framed by the variables population density, population concentration, 
as well as per capita income, which exercise an amplifying and dampening effect on 
climate vulnerability respectively.2 Vulnerability ranges from high (A2r), to 
intermediary (B2), to low (B1) in the scenarios presented here. 
Climate stabilization target uncertainty: As mentioned above this uncertainty is 
addressed by systematic model simulation for a range of alternative climate stabilization 
targets imposed on the no-policy baseline scenarios. Altogether we perform calculations 
for 11 stabilization scenarios for 8 comparable stabilization levels ranging from 480 to 
1390 ppmv (CO2-equivalent concentration for all greenhouse gases taken together) by 
2100. The number of stabilization scenarios analyzed is highest (5) for the high 
emissions scenario A2r, followed by scenario B1 (4 stabilization levels analyzed) and 
scenario B2 (2 stabilization levels). The higher the baseline emissions such as in 
scenario A2r, the higher therefore is also the number and range of stabilization targets 
                                                 
2 To illustrate the concept of climate vulnerability consider the impacts of Katrina on New Orleans. 
Impacts were a function of magnitude of the event (Katrina), location (areas of New Orleans being 
located below sea level) as well as socio-economic variables defining risk exposure: population density 
and concentration (New Orleans being a city, as opposed to other low population density coastal areas 
also affected by Katrina), as well as income per head, with poor residents of the city being particularly 
vulnerable. 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Scenarios 
    A2r B2 B1 
uncertainty 
type 
  
factors affecting uncertainty classification of scenarios:  
High (H), Medium (M), Low 
(L) 
relative to reach other 
population size H M L 
income L M H 
resource use efficiency L M H 
technology dynamics fossil M M L 
technology dynamics non-fossil L M H 
emissions H M L 
emissions 
(magnitude of 
CC) 
  
  
  
  
  
     
population size H M L 
urbanization H M L 
income L M H 
vulnerability H M L 
vulnerability 
  
  
  
       
exogeneous input 
scale of required reduction 
 
H 
 
M 
  
L 
target (for 
stabilization) 
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and resulting emission reduction needs (and costs) examined to fully represent target 
uncertainties.3 
For reasons of scenario parsimony, our set of three scenarios does not include a scenario 
that combines high emissions (and hence high climate change) with low vulnerability 
(e.g. as reflected in high per capita incomes). These were the characteristics of the 
scenarios within the A1 scenario family in the SRES report (for details see Nakicenovic 
et al., 2000, and Metz et al., 2001) that also explored the impacts of alternative 
directions of technological change on future emission levels. This group of scenarios, 
while of considerable interest especially for technology uncertainty analysis, is not 
analyzed further here. 
In addition of addressing the uncertainties summarized above the scenarios also have an 
additional methodological purpose: they serve as integrative tool to link a variety of 
sectorial models (energy, agriculture, forestry) under continued development at IIASA, 
helping to quantify interlinkages and feedbacks between various sectors that are at the 
core of comprehensive (multi-gas) climate stabilization efforts. 
The scenarios also help to put additional sensitivity and uncertainty analyses performed 
within sectorial models into perspective (e.g., Rokityanskiy et al., forthcoming; Fischer 
et al., forthcoming). The significance of this feature can only be fully appreciated when 
considering that the climate policy analysis literature has to date been “plagued” by 
significant problems of incomparability of results as different models and analyses 
continue to use widely different projections and scenarios as their analytical basis. 
2 An Overview of Scenarios 
This section provides a quantitative overview of the scenarios. Before however 
proceeding to the customary presentation of numerous input assumptions and their 
resulting outcomes in terms of greenhouse gas emissions and resulting climate 
consequences, it might be useful to provide some context in form of qualitative scenario 
“narratives” or “storylines” (Box 1). In fact, the blending of both qualitative as well as 
quantitative scenario characteristics is a comparatively recent methodological 
improvement in the scenario literature (most prominently developed for the SRES 
scenario exercise on which we draw heavily here) that to date has been characterized by 
the (largely separated) co-existence of qualitative scenario “narratives” with quantitative 
model-based “number crunching” scenario descriptions (for a review of these two 
scenario streams see Nakicenovic et al., 2000). 
 
 
                                                 
3 Note that in our model simulations, stabilization below some 500 ppmv CO2 only (670 ppmv  CO2 
equivalent concentration considering all GHGs) in the A2r scenario was technically not feasible with the 
range of scenario assumptions deemed congruent with the A2r scenario storyline. 
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2.1 Scenario “storylines” 
BOX 1  Scenario Storylines  
(italics are quotations from the original SRES storylines as presented in the SRES Summary for Policy 
Makers (SPM), Nakicenovic et al., 2000) 
 
A2 (A2r): 
The A2 storyline describes a very heterogeneous world. Fertility patterns across regions converge only 
slowly which results in continuously increasing global population. The resulting “high population 
growth” scenario adopted here is with 12 billion by 2100 lower than the original “high  population” 
SRES scenario A2 (15 billion), reflecting the most recent consensus of demographic projections towards 
lower future population levels as a result of a more rapid recent decline in fertility levels of developing 
countries. Fertility patterns in our A2r scenario initially diverge as a result of an assumed delay in the 
demographic transition from high to low fertility levels in many developing countries. This delay could 
result both of a reorientation to traditional family values in light of disappointed modernization 
expectations in this world of “fragmented regions” or be result of economic pressures from low income 
per capita in which large family size provides the only way of economic sustenance on the farm as well as 
in the city. Only after an initial period of delay (to 2030), fertility levels are assumed to converge slowly 
but show persistent patterns of heterogeneity from high (some developing regions such as Africa) to low 
(such as in Europe). Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic 
growth and technological change are more fragmented and slower than in other [scenarios]. Per capita 
GDP growth in our A2r scenario mirrors the theme of a “delayed fertility transition” in terms that 
potentials of economic catch-up are only opened, once the demographic transition is re-assumed and a 
“demographic window of opportunity” (favorable dependency ratios) opens (i.e. post 2030). As a result, 
in this scenario “the poor stay poor” (at least initially) and per capita income growth is the lowest among 
the scenarios explored and converges only extremely slowly, both internationally as well as regionally. 
The combination of high population with limited per capita income growth yields large internal and 
international migratory pressures for the poor seeking economic opportunities. Given the regionally 
fragmented characteristic of the A2 world, international migration is assumed to be tightly controlled 
through cultural, legal, and economic barriers. Therefore migratory pressures are primarily expressed 
through internal migration into cities. Consequently, this scenario assumes the highest levels of 
urbanization rates and largest income disparities, both within (e.g. between affluent districts and destitute 
“favelas”) cities as well as between urban-rural areas. Given persistent heterogeneity in income levels and 
the large pressures exercised on supplying enough materials, energy, and food for a rapidly growing 
population, supply structures and prices of commodities as well as of services remain different across and 
within regions, reflecting differences in resource endowments, productivities as well as regulatory 
priorities (e.g. for energy and food security). The more limited rates of technological change that result 
both from the slower rates of productivity and economic growth (reducing R&D as well capital turnover 
rates) translates into lower improvements of resource efficiency across all sectors leading to high energy, 
food, and natural resources demands, and corresponding expansion of agricultural lands and 
deforestation. The fragmented geopolitical nature of the scenario also results in a significant bottleneck 
for technology spillover effects and the international diffusion of advanced technologies. Energy supply is 
increasingly focused on low grade, regionally available resources, i.e. primarily coal, with post-fossil 
technologies (e.g. nuclear) only introduced in regions poorly endowed with resources. Resulting energy 
use and emission are consequently highest among the scenarios with carbon emissions approaching 20 Gt 
by 2050 and close to 30 Gt by 2100 (compared to 8 Gt in 2000). 
 
B1: 
The B1 storyline…describes a convergent world with [a low global population growth] that peaks in mid-
century and declines thereafter [to some 7 billion by 2100], but with rapid changes in economic 
structures towards a service and information economy, with reduction in material intensity and the 
introduction of clean and resource efficient technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to 
economic, social and environmental sustainability, including improved equity… Given that latest 
demographic projections confirm a level of 7 billion by 2100 as a qualified lower bound of the 
uncertainty of future population growth, we retain the original SRES population scenario here. Fertility 
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levels are converging towards sub-replacement levels, leading to a decline in global population in the 
second half of the 21st century. However, regional differences in fertility patterns are not assumed to 
disappear entirely in this scenario. The theme of converging demographic patters is also mirrored in the 
economic growth outlook of the scenario where the core characteristic is one of a conditional 
convergence to the prevailing economic productivity frontier. Hence per capita GDP growth is assumed 
to be the highest of the scenarios analyzed and incomes are assumed to converge both internationally as 
well as domestically given a favorable institutional environment domestically (e.g. stable institutional and 
efficient regulatory settings) as well as internationally (international development cooperation, and free 
flow of knowledge and technologies, enhanced by dedicated transfer mechanisms). The concept of 
conditional convergence is key in this scenario. As economic growth increasingly accrues from service 
and information-intensive activities, traditional industrial and locational comparative advantages are 
reduced and high human capital (education) moves to the forefront providing a “level playing field” for 
initially poorly-endowed regions to catch up to the productivity frontier. Per capita incomes are thus 
converging, however only conditionally as a result of investments into human capital and a general trend 
towards pushing the productivity frontier to ever higher service and information-intensive economic 
activities, assumed extant in this scenario. Distributive policies both domestically as well as 
internationally (along the EU regional cohesion fund model) also play a major role. As a result, the 
scenario assumes policy-driven comparatively high convergence rates in per capita income differences 
both internationally as well as domestically, ultimately blurring the traditional distinction between urban 
wealth and rural poverty that lead to a substantial reduction in economic incentives for rural-urban 
migration (and hence the lowest urbanization rates in the scenarios analyzed). While developing regions 
thus may reach, even surpass current productivity (and income) levels of the most advanced regions, their 
growth nonetheless still remains conditional on the growth rate of pushing the overall productivity 
frontier and thus on the absolute productivity (and income) levels achieved in the leading regions. Hence, 
international differences in productivity levels also prevail in this scenario, even if at much lower levels 
than in the other scenarios explored. No systematic “economic overtake” is assumed in the scenario. The 
emphasis on information-intensive and “dematerialization” of economic growth also implies that given an 
assumed continued development of modern communication infrastructures such as the internet, the 
importance of “space” (locational advantages especially of urban agglomerations) diminishes 
significantly. “Distance” not necessarily acts any longer as a defining characteristic of economic 
transaction costs, access to knowledge and availability of technology. Combined with the assumed global 
availability of clean and high efficiency production technologies for food, raw materials, energy, as well 
as manufacturing, differences in resource and environmental productivities are reduced significantly, 
leading to comparatively low levels of GHG emissions even in absence of dedicated climate policies. 
Carbon emission for instance peak at some 10 Gt by 2050 in order to fall below current levels thereafter 
(5 Gt by 2100) with the progressive international diffusion of rapidly improving post-fossil technologies. 
 
B2: 
The B2 storyline…describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and 
environmental sustainability. It is a world with continuously increasing population at a rate lower than in 
A2, intermediate levels of economic development, and less rapid and more diverse technological change 
than in the B1…storyline. By design, the B2 scenario is an intermediary scenario, characterized by 
“dynamics as usual” rates of change, inspired by historical analogies where appropriate (e.g. shifts in food 
preferences), but also departing from historical contingencies (e.g. growth in ITC activities and 
technologies). World population growth is assumed to reach some 10 billion by 2100, based on the UN 
central projection underlying the original SRES scenario and retained also here. The UN scenario 
assumes strong convergence in fertility levels towards replacement levels, ultimately yielding a 
stabilization of world population levels. Like total population size, urbanization rates in this scenario are 
assumed to be intermediary as well, bridging the more extreme scenarios A2r (high) and B1 (low).  The 
economic growth outlook in B2 is regionally more heterogeneous, with per capita income growth and 
convergence assumed to be intermediary between the two more extreme scenarios A2r and B1 
respectively, largely reflecting 20th century historical experiences, without however assuming large 
discontinuities such as economic decline or “lost decades” of economic development for any particular 
region. The dynamics of income growth are assumed to be tightly correlated with rates of social 
modernization, as reflected for instance in the dynamics of the demographic transition. In low-income 
regions where this transition has progressed further and more dynamically, also per capita productivity 
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(income) growth is assumed to higher (e.g. China). In lagging regions (e.g. Africa) economic catch-up is 
assumed to be delayed until the time the demographic transition accelerates. Peak of per capita income 
growth therefore is assumed to coincide with the fertility transition metric (second derivative of 
population growth). Given a more modest technology outlook, resource endowments and differences in 
income levels result in only slowly converging differences between domestic and international demands, 
productivities, and prices. For instance, regions endowed with large energy resources (such as the Middle 
East) would experience continued low energy prices and thus more lavish energy use patterns compared 
to import dependent regions such as Japan or Western Europe that would continue pushing the energy 
productivity frontier along their historical “high efficiency” trajectory. Resulting food, energy and 
resource demands and corresponding GHG emissions are consequently also intermediary between the two 
more extreme scenarios A2r and B1. Global carbon emissions for instance could rise initially along 
historical rates (to some 13 Gt by 2050), but growth would eventually slow down (14 Gt by 2100) as 
progressively more regions shift away from their reliance on fossil fuels as a twin result of technological 
progress in alternatives and increasing scarcity of easy access fossil resources.  
 
Readers are advised to exercise their own judgment on the plausibility of above scenario 
“storylines” that contain particularly in the two more extreme scenarios A2r and B1 a 
number of normative scenario elements. However, the plausibility of these scenarios 
also needs to be put in context with the objectives of the scenario exercise reported here, 
namely to explore possible developments that could result in either high or low 
emission futures. From that perspective, scenario B1 that might look at first glance very 
normative (“desirable” under the sustainable development paradigm, and definitively 
less “desirable” in terms of a perpetuation of the current geopolitical and economic 
status quo) with its paradigmatic theme of (conditional) convergence, needs to be 
assessed in terms of its plausibility not as a “business as usual” scenario (which it is 
definitively not), but rather in terms of a plausible narrative of how a low emissions 
future could unfold even in absence of vigorous, dedicated climate policies. From that 
perspective, the scenario aims at illustrating a plausible “best case” within the context of 
both magnitude of future climate change (low emissions) as well as (low) vulnerability 
to climate change (as for instance represented in its high per capita income projections), 
which we feel as of high importance in a comprehensive assessment of uncertainties 
surrounding climate change. 
From that perspective, while we certainly do not consider the B1 scenario “likely” in 
view of current trends, we claim that it is perhaps the most likely scenario yielding both 
low emissions as well as low vulnerability to climate change in a comprehensive 
assessment of uncertainties. Thus even if challenging, we maintain the legitimacy of the 
“convergence” theme underlying the B1 scenario as a “best case” scenario for climate 
policy assessment. We also maintain that the scenario, while being “extreme” in the 
unfolding of existing trends is not counterfactual (hence not implausible) with respect to 
historical experience and economic theory and the evidence put forward by the 
economic convergence literature once inherent data, measurement, and modeling 
uncertainties are taken into account.  
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2.2 Scenario quantifications 
2.2.1 Demographic and Economic Development 
A distinguishing feature of the scenarios reported here is that they consider 
demographic and economic development not as autonomous processes but instead as 
(partly) interlinked. These linkages however do not operate in a deterministic or one-
directional sense: e.g. that a given rate of demographic transition and its resulting 
demographic opportunity window4 would automatically translate to a particular rate and 
pattern of economic growth, or vice versa. Instead these linkages operate at a 
conditional level, i.e. are subject to variations in accordance to a given scenario feature 
as described in its respective “storyline”. Scenarios B1 and A2r describe the more 
extreme manifestations of the demographic-economic development nexus, whereas 
scenario B2 displays less pronounced linkages. In B1, a rapid demographic transition 
from high to low fertility leads to low total population projection. Combined with 
assumed high levels of education and free access to knowledge, capital, and technology 
enables especially developing countries to make full use of their demographic 
opportunity window. Rates of economic growth accelerate with progress of the 
demographic transition and are assumed to peak at the demographic opportunity 
window (maximum of second derivative of population growth). In turn, accelerated 
rates of modernization as reflected in economic development catch up feed back onto 
demographic development as well, maintaining the rapid mortality and fertility 
transitions characteristic of the B1 scenario. Conversely scenario A2r with its delayed 
demographic transition intends to illustrate the “downside” of the demographic-
economic development linkages explored in the scenarios. The assumed delayed 
demographic transition in A2r not only leads to a high population projection, but also to 
a delay in the potential to fully use the demographic opportunity window for 
development catch-up. Combined with the more fragmented geopolitical outlook that 
limits free access to knowledge and technology, corresponding economic growth rates 
are much lower in an A2r world resulting initially even in a further divergence of 
income differences between “North” and “South.” 
In terms of adopting numerical scenario values (summarized in Table 2), we have 
analyzed in detail the corresponding scenario literature. For population we have retained 
the original SRES low (B1) and medium (B2) scenarios respectively as in good 
agreement with the most recent demographic projections from the UN (2005) and 
IIASA (Lutz and Sanderson, 2001; O’Neill, 2005). Global population grows from some 
6 billion in 2000 to some 9 billion (8.7-9.3 billion in B1 and B2 respectively) and to 
between 7 (B1) and 10.4 (B2) billion by 2100. The original SRES A2 scenario with its 
projected population of some 15 billion by 2100 appears high in comparison with most 
recent projections that have generally shifted levels of future population downwards5 
(for a review see O’Neill et al., 2005). Therefore in our revised A2r scenario we use a 
                                                 
4 A period characterized by low dependency ratios, i.e. a high ratio of (potentially) economic active 
population (typically in the age group 15-65 years) to non-active population (younger and older age 
groups beyond 15-65 years). 
 
5
 The original A2 population scenarios is for instance higher than the most recent UN “high” projection 
and also above the 95th percentile of the IIASA probabilistic population projections. 
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modified IIASA projection for the “high population” growth quantification. The 
scenario is characterized by an assumed delay in the demographic transition of some 
two to three decades, leading to a world population of some 10 billion by 2050 and of 
12.4 billion by 2100. A comparison of the world population scenarios reported here 
with the original SRES study as well as most recent population projections from IIASA 
and the United Nations is shown in Figure 1. 
In terms of economic growth all scenarios describe a world becoming more affluent, 
albeit at different rates and with different regional patterns.  
Global economic output (GEO) is estimated at 27 trillion $US(1990) at market 
exchange rates, MER) in the year 2000. By 2050, GEO would range between 106 (A2r), 
119 (B2) to 150 (B1) trillion Dollars. By 2100 the corresponding scenario range is 
between 204 (A2r), 270 (B2) and 392 (B1) trillion Dollars, corresponding to an increase 
between a factor of 7 to 14 over a time period of 100 years. This compares with an 
estimated factor of 18 growth in GEO over the last 100 years (1900-2000) according to 
the estimates of Angus Maddison.6 From this perspective all our scenarios are squarely 
within historical experience and also not particularly bullish when compared to the 
scenario literature (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
6 Source: Maddison, 2001. Data are in principle not directly comparable as Maddison statistics refer to 
purchasing power GDP estimates. However, comparable long-range GDP estimates in market exchange 
rates exist only since 1960 (based on World Bank statistics discussed in Nakicenovic et al., 2003 ) and 
indicate a factor increase of 4.3 in GEO over the 1960-2000 period, compared to also a factor 4.3 increase 
in GEO estimated at purchasing power parities by Maddison over the 1960-2000 period. 
 
North South WORLD North South WORLD
1990 1271 3990 5262 17437 3430 20866
A2r 1430 6384 7814 32512 13258 45770
2020 B1 1440 6177 7617 34124 18017 52140
B2 1404 6268 7672 31420 17981 49401
A2r 1536 8708 10245 52422 47703 100125
2050 B1 1504 7200 8704 56074 79569 135644
B2 1370 7997 9367 46227 63153 109380
A2r 1663 10724 12386 84971 104256 189227
2100 B1 1448 5608 7056 100418 227932 328350
B2 1316 9105 10421 75698 163494 239192
GDP(mer) billion $(1990)Population, million
Table 2. Scenario Baselines: Population and GDP. 
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Figure 1. World Population: Scenarios presented here in comparison to the recent demographic 
literature 
 
Conversely, per capita GDP growth patterns portray a somewhat different pattern, in 
which scenario B1 by design describes an extremely affluent world in which also 
income disparities decline substantially, although absolute differences in per capita 
GDP continue to persist across all countries over the entire 21st century (see also 
Grubler et al. forthcoming). Thus, even in a scenario of assumed gradual conditional 
convergence in per capita income, there is no convergence in absolute income 
differences. Per capita income (at some 4,560 $US1990 and calculated with market 
exchange rates) in B1 could approach a challenging 55,000 $US by 2100, representing a 
12-fold increase over the 21st century. Scenario B2 is more conservative: a projected per 
capita income of some 25,000 $US by 2100 (or an increase of a factor of 5.8). Scenario 
A2r finally represents the lower side of economic growth outlook of our scenarios: per 
capita GDP would grow to some 16,000 $US by 2100, or by a factor of 3.7 over a time 
period of 100 years. To put these numbers into perspective: Maddison’s estimate of 
world per capita GDP growth between 1900 and 2000 is a factor of 4.8. Scenarios B1 
and A2r are therefore again squarely within historical experience with B1 being above 
and A2r being below the historical experience, a categorization that also applies when 
the scenarios are compared to the future scenarios literature (see Figure 2). 
In comparison to our earlier published scenarios (Grubler et al., 1996, Nakicenovic et 
al., 2000) that reported economic output using two alternative measures for converting 
national currencies into a common denominator (market exchange rates, MER, and 
purchasing power parities, PPP), the present study only considers GDP calculated with 
1990 market exchange rates (MER). There are two reasons for this. First, our study 
objective of assessing feasibility and costs of climate stabilization under full 
consideration of inter-sectorial linkages and feedbacks requires an economic conversion 
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metric commensurate with international comparative advantage (e.g. in assessing the 
relative economics of land-based biomass or forestry product production) and requires 
an endogenous representation of international trade in energy, food, forestry products, 
biofuels, and carbon and other greenhouse gases (in case of the stabilization scenarios 
examined), which dictates the use of market exchange rates. (The use of PPP conversion 
rates in determining international comparative advantage and trade would simply be 
methodologically flawed.) A second reason for refraining to report PPP estimates of 
GDP is methodological. Given that the models used in our analysis are formulated at the 
level of regional aggregates (e.g. all of Latin America is considered as a single region) 
the use of PPP entails intricate index number and aggregation problems across 
countries/regions and over time. These are best addressed by detailed bottom-up 
aggregations of scenarios formulated at the national level, which we have developed for 
this study (see Grubler et al., forthcoming). A reformulated and recalibrated model to 
calculate PPP scenarios “bottom-up” is under development and will be reported 
subsequently. In the meantime we ask readers for their patience and understanding 
considering the size of the task involved (solving simultaneously equations for 185 
countries and for three scenarios). PPP as comparison metric, even if valuable for other 
purposes such as climate impact assessments, is neither appropriate nor necessary for 
the analysis presented here and therefore we leave its publication to a later paper. 
 
Figure 2. Economic growth rates (percent per year) for total GDP (top panels) and GDP per 
capita (bottom panels) and for UNFCC Annex-I (i.e. industrialized, left panels)and non-Annex-I 
(i.e. developing, right panels) countries. Scenarios presented here in camparison with statistics 
derived from the scenario literature. 
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2.2.2 Technology, Resource Efficiency, and Energy and Land use 
In the previous sections, we have formulated the basic drivers of demand in the 
scenarios including population and income. Now we address the interlinked issues of 
resource availability, efficiency, and the corresponding technologies that “intermediate” 
between demand and supply. 
To represent their salient uncertainties we again follow the basic scenario taxonomy 
introduced above, ranging from conservative (A2r), intermediary (B2) to optimistic 
(B1).  
A general feature of our scenarios, consistent with our interpretation of economic and 
technology history is that productivity growth and technology growth rates are 
interrelated. In other words, in scenarios of high macroeconomic productivity growth as 
reflected in per capita incomes (B1), also the productivity of resource use (e.g. energy, 
agricultural land) and rates of technological innovation are high. In turn, the rapid 
capital turnover rate resulting from high economic growth, enables a rapid diffusion of 
new technology vintages, rendering the high productivity and efficiency scenario 
storyline internally consistent. Scenario A2r maintains the same scenario logic, 
representing with its lower productivity, efficiency, and innovation rates the “slow 
progress” mirror image of the B1 scenario. It is important to emphasize the two way 
linkages and interdependencies of these variables that lead to complex patterns in the 
scenarios that defy simplistic linear scaling perceptions. In our view it is precisely the 
nature of these complex, non-linear relationships that make a scenario analysis with 
formal models both a necessity for achieving internally consistency as well as providing 
an informed basis for policy debates. 
For instance, the scenarios illustrate that higher economic growth not necessarily 
translates into a proportional growth in energy demand and resulting emissions. The 
growth of the latter is moderated by higher rates of technological change and efficiency 
improvements that counterbalance the demand and emissions growth of an increase in 
economic activity. This is illustrated best for instance in comparing the energy intensity 
(energy use per unit of GDP) across our scenarios (Figure 3).  Ceteris paribus, 
intensities are lowest in the B1 scenario, precisely because of its high productivity, 
technology, and capital turnover rates, with economic structural change resulting from 
rapid economic development also playing an important role. Conversely energy 
intensities are highest in the A2r scenario illustrating the resource efficiency 
implications of limited productivity and technological innovation growth. Only through 
massive (and costly) efforts as illustrated in the A2r stabilization scenarios, do 
intensities approach those of the much more efficient B1 scenario, which because of its 
high efficiency achieved already in the baseline, needs comparatively little further 
adjustments under the climate stabilization targets imposed on the scenario.  
The different demands for energy, as well as food and forest products of the scenarios 
determine their respective levels of resource utilization. For agriculture and forests 
assessments of resource availability are a straightforward matter, as land availability is 
fixed and land-use patterns are endogenized in the scenarios as a function of current 
uses and projected future demand/supply interactions (see Fischer et al., and 
Rokityanskiy et al. forthcoming). For energy, the situation is more complex. First, the 
amount of fossil fuels that might become available in the future is inherently uncertain 
as both a function of degree of explorative efforts, leading to new discoveries, as well as 
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the evolution of technology (exogenous input to our scenarios) as well as prices 
(endogenous in our scenarios). By and large we follow the quantitative assumptions 
adopted for the corresponding scenarios in the SRES report (and detailed in 
Nakicenovic et al., 2000). For renewable energies, the scenario literature (including our 
earlier work) has to date relied on exogenously determined upper bounds for physical 
supply potentials derived from the literature (see e.g. WEA, 2000) without explicit 
treatment of technology or of economics (prices). Taking advantage of our integrated 
modeling framework, we replace this traditional approach by a new one that explicitly 
considers competing land uses for food, fiber, and forest products and the resulting 
economics of supply. This has led to a revision of our earlier estimates as a result of the 
endogenization of the economics of land-based bio-energy and carbon sequestration 
options, which we consider a major methodological advance over the modeling state-of-
art. 
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Figure 3 Energy Use per Unit of GDP (energy intensity) for the three baseline scenarios and 
their climate stabilization scenarios. 
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Fossil fuel resource availability is differentiated in our study by major fuel (coal, oil, 
and gas) as well as by resource category (esp. conventional versus unconventional 
resources). Figure 4 summarizes our assumptions at the global level giving both 
exogenously defined upper bounds on resource availability as well as endogenously 
determined actual use (or “call on resources”). All of our scenarios reflect the well 
known dichotomy of the inverse relationship between availability and quality of fossil 
energy resources. Easily accessible and clean resources (e.g. conventional gas) are 
relatively scarce in comparison to “dirty” (coal), or difficult to harvest “dirty” fossil 
fuels (unconventional oil such as tar sands or oil shale). Nonetheless, even in 
considering uncertainty, the scenarios indicate that the frequently voiced fear of 
“running out” of energy resources needs to be contrasted by a graduation from easy-
access, “clean”, to more difficult to access “dirty” fossil fuels.  
Actual resource use in the scenarios, in turn result from the interplay between 
exogenously defined upper bounds on resource availability (“potentials”), assumed rates 
of technological progress, as well as the relative economics between different fossil fuel 
resources and their non-fossil substitutes that play out under the different demand 
scenarios examined, ranging from “high” (A2r) to low (B1). The “call on resources” for 
coal in our scenarios provides a good illustration. In the A2r scenario demand is high 
(high population growth combined with slower productivity growth and thus less 
progress on the efficiency front), international trade in energy and technology is limited 
and overall rates of technological progress are assumed to be more modest, limiting the 
contribution from (expensive) alternatives to fossil fuels. As a result, the scenario relies 
heavily on coal (including for synfuels production) resulting in high emissions. 
Conversely, scenario B1 with its lower energy demand (as a twin result of lower 
population, combined with high productivity growth) and an assumed rapid progress in 
post-fossil technologies (that diffuse rapidly due to the high capital turnover rates of this 
“high growth” scenario) relies little on coal (even with an assumed similar physical 
availability as in the A2r scenario). Instead, in a B1 world, natural gas serves as 
“transition fuel” to a post-fossil energy system, resulting in comparatively low 
emissions. Scenario B2 is situated in-between scenarios A2r and B1. Therefore, 
invariably the traditional deterministic perspective on resource availability (“how much 
to dig out, when”) is replaced in the scenarios reported here by a view that considers 
resource availability not as geologically, but rather as socially and technologically 
“constructed”. This is reflected in different scenario tendencies of the evolution of 
demand, exploration efforts, technological change (in fossils as well as post-fossil 
alternatives) and the resulting comparative economic interplay of different energy 
supply options.7 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that this scenario characteristic emerges also out of our scenario design that ignored 
the possibility that high demand for clean fossil fuels might induce technological change in a direction 
that would render these resources more widely available and at competitive prices, e.g. in form of cheap, 
unconventional gas (e.g. methane hydrates). Such as scenario, while not examined here, is nonetheless 
consistent with our interpretation of the history of fossil resource availability and use. A quantification is 
provided in the “A1G” scenarios of the SRES report (Nakicenvic et al., 2000).  
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Figure 4. Fossil energy resources: Assumed availability (left bars) and actual use (right bars) for 
oil (top panel), natural gas (middle panel), and coal (bottom panel) in the scenarios. 
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For renewable resources we have adopted a new methodology to translate theoretical 
potentials (the renewable equivalent to fossil fuel “resources”) into supply potentials 
consistent with competitive land uses and prices from non-energy sectors (agriculture 
and forestry). Our new approach improves on a traditional drawback of sectorial energy 
models that have to date only considered availability and costs of biofuels in a 
competitive context within the energy sector proper, but not in relation to other sectors.  
To that end, we perform model iterations between the forest, agriculture and energy 
sector models until a consistent picture with respect to land availability and prices is 
derived (see also Section 3 below). Compared to earlier published results, we were 
therefore able to improve upon scenario consistency. Figure 5 compares our revised 
estimates of biomass potentials and use with those used in the SRES scenario exercise. 
Revisions at the global level are minor for the A2r and B2 scenarios, but significant in 
the case of the B1 scenario.  
The high economic growth projection of that scenario results in an inflationary trend on 
land prices thus limiting the economic availability of land resources for biofuels in 
comparison to alternative land uses (settlements, agriculture, and forests), resulting in a 
corresponding reduction in the resource potential for biomass in the B1 scenario.  
Equally visible in Figure 5, is that the baseline scenarios only use a fraction of the 
(revised) production potentials. With increasing climate constraints and emission 
reduction efforts however, increasingly larger fractions of the biomass resource 
potentials are exploited. Respective levels are again determined within a consistent 
economic framework always considering alternative land uses, which we consider a 
major methodological and scenario advance for energy and climate policy models that 
have to date not been able to consider these interdependencies.  
Table 3 summarizes our scenarios in terms of major resource use category: energy, and 
agricultural and forestry land use. As indicated above, the energy sector scenarios were 
calculated for all three baseline scenarios and their stabilization counterparts, whereas 
for the forestry and agricultural sector resource constraints allowed only analysis of the 
two “extreme” scenarios A2r and B1. Global energy use in the scenarios is projected to 
increase up to four-fold over the next century (A2r). Only in the scenario with highest 
productivity, efficiency and technological change (B1) is this growth reduced to a factor 
two increase over the next century. Given the range of uncertainties explored in our 
scenarios further energy demand growth above the levels projected here appears 
unlikely as more vigorous demand growth would be counterbalanced by increasing 
pressures on resource availability resulting in rising energy prices that in turn would 
further induce energy conservation measures and bias technological change in direction 
of factor substitution.8  
Contrary to earlier scenarios published in the literature (cf. the review in Alcamo et al., 
1995), in which forest cover almost invariably declined substantially due to continued 
deforestation, our scenarios indicate a somewhat different pattern. Despite continued 
short- to medium-term deforestation in the tropics (especially in scenario A2r), global 
forest cover remains initially stable due to substantial afforestation in industrialized 
                                                 
8
 For a contrasting scenario see the A1 scenario family developed for the SRES report (Nakicenovic et al., 
2000). 
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countries (for a discussion see Rokityanskiy et al., forthcoming9). Our alternative 
scenarios suggest instead the possibility of a stabilization of forest cover and 
preservation of forest resources over the next century. This hold especially for the 
environmental “preservationist” scenario B1 as well as in the stabilization scenarios 
where forest cover increases due to enhanced utilization of forests as carbon sinks.  
Last but not least, we consider technology as important diver for our scenarios. Rates of 
technological change are critical across all sectors and for both demand as well as 
supply aspects that together determine future GHG emission levels. Assumptions about 
pace and direction of technological change are scenario dependent, ranging from high 
(B1) to intermediate (B2), to low (A2r). The scenarios equally assume that 
technological change that by its nature is cumulative, builds upon clusters of interrelated 
technologies that result in path-dependent behavior in the scenarios. Scenario A2r for 
instance, continues to rely on derivatives of current fossil fuel technologies to match the 
growing demand for liquid fuels and electricity from conventional sources such as coal, 
resulting in high emissions. Conversely, in scenario B1, technological change favors the 
development of fossil-fuel alternatives that branch out in order to ultimately pave the 
way for a transition away from the current reliance on fossil fuel technologies and 
resources, leading to low emissions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 This scenario feature requires further in-depth analysis with respect to its short-term feasibility and 
congruence with current and near-term trends. 
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Figure 5. Biomass energy potentials (left bars) and actual use (right bars) in the scenarios (in 
EJ): Comparison of previous estimates (left bars) with this study (right bars). 
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Table 3 Main resource use in the scenarios: Energy (EJ), forest, and agricultural land (in 
hectares). Note that the different sectorial models analyzed not always the full range of the 
altogether three baseline and 11 mitigation scenarios explored with the MESSAGE-MACRO 
model. 
 
  2000 2020 2050 2100 
Primary Energy (EJ)           
A2r A        A2r 402 628 1173 1742 
A2r-stab.* 402 595 - 628 926 - 1162 1162 - 1644
B1 402 596 953 1041 
B1-stab.* 402 554 - 594 857 - 945 986 - 1012
B2 402 616 930 1288 
B2-stab. 402 567 - 584 798 - 829 1017 - 1046
Forest land (mil. ha)           
A2r 4217 4242 4244 4234 
A2r-stab.** 4217 4251 4284 4438 
B1 4217 4300 4410 4636 
B1-stab.** 4217 4302 4419 4679 
B2 4217 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
B2-stab. 4217 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Agricultural land (mil. ha)                     
A2r  1576 +  1606   1693  1741 
A2r-stab. n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  n.a. 
B1  1575 +  1599   1634  1591 
B1-stab. n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  n.a. 
B2 n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  n.a. 
B2-stab. n.a.   n.a.   n.a.     n.a.   
* Range across all stabilization levels          
** Values refer to the intermediate stabilization level of 670 ppmv (CO2-eq.)       
+
   Values for year 2010.    
 
Figure 6. Representing technology dynamics in the scenarios: Example of Investment costs 
(US$(1990) per kilo-Watt) for selected energy technologies over time and across scenarios. 
Note that technology assumptions are varied in the three baseline scenarios only. The imposition 
of alternative climate stabilization targets is not assumed to affect availability and costs of 
technologies beyond those assumed for the respective scenario baseline. 
Technological change assumptions in the scenarios operate both at the level of 
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aggregate trends such as macro-economic productivity growth or resource efficiency, as 
well as at the sectorial level (e.g. crop yields in agriculture). The detailed, “bottom-up” 
energy sector model MESSAGE deploys technology-specific assumptions on 
availability, performance, and costs of energy conversion technologies whose dynamics 
unfold over time (for an example see Figure 6). All technology specific assumptions 
relate to the aggregate characteristics chosen for describing the three scenarios and thus 
provide a consistent picture ranging from rapid change and improvements (B1) to a 
straightforward conservative technology outlook (A2r). Figure 7 provides an aggregate 
illustration of the resulting dynamics of technological change across the scenarios 
analyzing the resulting carbon emissions intensity per unit of GDP. 
The resulting trends for the three baseline scenarios are indicative of their respective 
positioning concerning the dynamics of technological change: rapid, leading to a 
pronounced “decarbonization” trend in B1 and more slowly (with less decarbonization) 
in scenario A2r. The technological challenge ahead for climate stabilization scenarios is 
equally well illustrated in Figure 7. In order to achieve climate stabilization, rates of 
decarbonization would have to be accelerated significantly, surpassing for instance in 
the stabilization scenarios of the otherwise the conservative scenario A2r those assumed 
for the optimistic B1 scenario baseline. Perhaps even more noteworthy is to consider the 
lowest stabilization scenarios where emissions would have to be reduced below zero 
levels. This implies in the most stringent stabilization scenarios in addition to low 
emissions also massive carbon management in form of carbon sequestration and 
disposal as reflected in the negative values for carbon intensities towards the end of the 
21st century.  
2.2.3 GHG emissions and Climate Impacts 
Figure 8 summarizes the scenario outcomes in terms of the three most important 
greenhouse gases CO2 (carbon dioxide expressed as tons elemental carbon), CH4 
(methane) and N20 (nitrous oxide). The emission patterns reflect the overall scenario 
taxonomy adopted for this study ranging from high (A2r) to low (B1) with the B2 
scenario taking a more intermediary position. This relative ranking of emissions should 
however not be interpreted as being simply a result of linear scaling of relationships. 
The drivers for high or low emissions respectively across the scenarios are both scenario 
as well as sector specific. For instance, the high carbon emissions in the A2r scenario 
are dominated by energy sector emissions that are high are a result of high growth in 
demand due to the combined effects of high population growth, and more limited 
efficiency improvements and that are coupled with slower rates of technology 
improvements that result from lower economic productivity growth. Conversely, the 
high emissions for CH4 and N20 in A2r result primarily from demand growth for 
agricultural products reflecting the dominance of this sector for these two greenhouse 
gases. 
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Figure 7. Carbon emissions per unit energy used (carbon intensity) across the three baseline 
scenarios and their stabilization counterparts. Note that negative values indicate exceedence of 
carbon sinks (natural and via carbon sequestration and storage) over emissions. 
 
Figure 8 also shows the illustrative emissions trajectories that result from imposing ever 
more stringent ex ante pre-specified climate stabilization constraints onto the three 
baseline scenarios. In the most stringent stabilization scenarios, emissions even can turn 
negative as a result of very low emissions and large-scale carbon sequestration e.g. from 
biofuels.10 It needs to be emphasized that these emission trajectories are the result from 
an intertemporal least-cost optimization framework with perfect foresight that in 
addition assumes full intertemporal, spatial, as well as sectorial flexibility (see also 
Section 3 below). In other words, the model calculations illustrate pathways towards 
climate stabilization assuming that emission reductions happen in a “perfect” economic 
environment in absence of uncertainty, free riding, and all other possible market 
imperfections. In the stabilization scenarios reductions are performed when, where (in 
space or across sectors), and by what measure it is cheapest to do so. These assumptions 
that result from applying an optimization framework to the analysis of stabilization 
scenarios, which is customary state of the art in climate policy analysis, evidently are 
                                                 
10
 In such scenarios, carbon uptake from the atmosphere by vegetation that is subsequently sequestered 
and disposed in permanent formations yields negative emissions. 
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highly stylized. The resulting model calculations should there not be interpreted as pre-
scripive but simple as “best case” illustrative scenarios of possible globally least-cost 
pathways towards climate stabilization. 
Figure 9 positions our scenarios within the entire climate change scenario literature 
using two important pre-curser indicators for their potential for climate change: 
cumulative carbon emissions and atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Through or scenario 
design, we are able to represent with a very limited number of baseline scenarios and 
corresponding ranges in stabilization targets, the entire scenario space spanned by the 
climate change scenario literature. Thus, the scenarios are indeed parsimonious as well 
as comprehensive in providing input to climate models. 
Using a simplified climate model (see discussion in Section 3 below) we also can 
provide first estimates on the climate change implications of our scenarios (Table 4). In 
the baseline scenarios global mean temperature could increase between 2.7 (B1) to 4 
degrees (A2r) towards the end of the 21st century, leading to sea level rise of between 
some 60-70 centimeters. Even in the lowest, most ambitious climate policy scenario (a 
480 ppmv stabilization target imposed on the lowest baseline scenario B1), climate 
change remains inevitable: global mean temperature would still rise by some 1.6 
degrees and sea level by some 40 centimeters. This most “climate benign” is also an 
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Figure 8. Greenhouse gas emissions in the scenarios (CO2, in million tons elemental carbon),
methane (million tons CH4) and nitrous oxides (million tons N20). Note that negative emission
numbers for CO2 indicate exceedence of natural and man-made sinks over emissions. 
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excellent illustration that some climate change (and resulting impacts) will be 
inevitable, independently how the future unfolds. Future generations will have to adapt 
to a changing climate as a result of past emissions, the resulting committed global 
warming signal as wella s the twin inertias of the climate and socio-economic systems 
that make instantaneous emission reductions impossible and result in a long-lasting 
“imprint” of emissions on the climate system. 
 
 
Figure 9. The scenarios in this paper compared to the climate change and mitigation scenario 
literature in terms of two important climate change precursor indicators (cumulative carbon 
emissions 1990-2100, in GtC, and corresponding atmospheric CO2 concentrations, in ppmv). 
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B1 B1-670 B1-590 B1-520 B1-480 A2r A2r-1390 A2r-1090 A2r-970 A2r-820 A2r-670 B2 B2-670 B2-520
Carbon equivalent concentrations (ppmv)
2000 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
2050 623 612 584 561 537 621 607 580 576 590 578 645 588 566
2100 792 673 591 522 482 1630 1388 1088 971 819 668 983 673 516
Radiative forcing (W/m2)
2000 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37
2050 4.17 4.08 3.83 3.61 3.38 4.16 4.03 3.79 3.75 3.89 3.77 4.36 3.87 3.67
2100 5.45 4.59 3.89 3.23 2.81 9.29 8.44 7.14 6.53 5.63 4.54 6.60 4.65 3.17
Temperature change (degrees C)
2000 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
2050 1.70 1.68 1.61 1.56 1.49 1.44 1.40 1.33 1.33 1.40 1.41 1.72 1.55 1.53
2100 2.70 2.41 2.12 1.81 1.60 4.03 3.76 3.27 3.05 2.74 2.33 3.07 2.43 1.88
Sea level rise (cm)
2000 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58 7.58
2050 28.44 28.20 27.61 26.96 26.22 25.86 25.33 24.59 24.55 25.02 25.10 28.97 26.90 26.66
2100 57.00 53.94 50.18 46.31 42.97 69.64 66.62 61.03 58.58 55.95 51.53 61.17 53.42 47.30
B1 A2r B2
 
Table 4. Main climate change outcomes of the scenarios analyzed. 
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3 Scenario Methodology and Model Linkages  
For the development of the scenarios we use a set of interlinked disciplinary and 
sectorial models referred to as Integrated Assessment Modeling Framework (illustrated 
in Figure 10). The framework combines a careful blend of rich disciplinary models 
operating at alternative spatial resolution that are interlinked and integrated into an 
overall assessment framework. The framework covers all greenhouse-gas emitting 
sectors, including agriculture, forestry, energy and industrial sources for a full basket of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), including CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, CF4, and SF6. In contrast 
to the traditional model integration through simplified “black box” representation of 
individual components, our modeling approach encompasses a detailed representation 
of each of the individual sectors. Integration is achieved through a series of hard and 
soft-linkages between the individual components, ensuring internal scenario consistency 
and plausibility. 
At the origin of our scenario formulation is a scenario storyline, a textual description or 
narrative of how the world might unfold. The storyline describes the evolution of main 
driving forces, such as socio-economic, demographic, and technological change as well 
as related policies in a qualitative way (see Section 2 above). The storyline serves as the 
basis for the quantification of global and regional GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as 
well as regional population trajectories. Through a combination of decomposition and 
optimization methods world regional scenario results are then first disaggregated to the 
level of countries. In a subsequent second step, national results are further disaggregated 
to the grid-cell level, providing spatially explicit patterns of population and economic 
activities (see Gruebler et al., forthcoming). The latter indicators are particularly 
important for the spatially explicit modeling of land-cover changes in the forest and 
agricultural sector as they provide the basis for the estimation of consistent, 
internationally comparable indicators (such as relative land prices) defining the relative 
comparative advantage of agricultural and forestry based GHG mitigation options. 
The regional, national, and spatially explicit demographic and economic projections 
serve as exogenous inputs to the three principal models of the IA-framework (Figure 
10): DIMA (Rokityanskiy et al., fothcoming), AEZ/BLS (Fischer et al., forthcoming), 
and MESSAGE-MACRO (cf. Nakicenovic et al., 2000, and Rao and Riahi, 2006): 
The DIMA model is used for the estimation of forest-related land use changes, including 
reforestation, afforestation and deforestation (RAD) and forest management as triggered 
by carbon sink and bioenergy incentives. It operates on a half degree grid basis on 
global scale. Its main outputs are spatially explicit biomass energy supply schedules and 
sink-enhancement activities consistent with the scenario’s prices for CO2 and bioenergy 
(see Rokityanskiy et al., forthcoming).  
The AEZ/BLS modeling framework provides a detailed account of the evolution of the 
agricultural sector. AEZ (agro-ecological zones) uses agronomic-based knowledge to 
simulate land resources availability and use, farm-level management options, and crop 
production potentials as a function of climate; at the same time, it employs detailed 
spatial biophysical and socio-economic datasets to distribute its computations at fine 
gridded intervals over the entire globe (e.g., Fischer et al., 2002a). In addition to land 
resource assessment and computation of potentially-attainable yield, this analysis 
included an agro-economic model for estimation of actual regional production and 
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consumption, using the Basic Linked System (BLS) developed at IIASA. BLS provides 
a framework for analyzing the world food system, viewing national agricultural 
components as embedded in national economies, which in turn interact with each other 
at the international trade level (see, e.g., Fischer et al., 2002b). The BLS model consists 
of 34 national and regional geographical components covering the globe. In this study 
the AEZ/BLS framework was used for 1) the estimation of agricultural impacts of 
climate change and adaptation needs in terms of water supply, 2) the assessment of 
potential conflict of bioenergy and forest activities with food security, and 3) the 
estimation of changes in agricultural demand and commodities, the  principal drivers of 
non-CO2 greenhouse gases.  
The MESSAGE-MACRO modeling framework comprises the systems engineering 
optimization model MESSAGE (Messner and Strubegger, 1995) and the top-down 
macroeconomic equilibrium model MACRO (Manne and Richels, 1992). MESSAGE 
and MACRO are linked iteratively, permitting the estimation of internally consistent 
scenarios of energy prices and energy systems costs – derived from a detailed systems 
engineering model (MESSAGE) – with economic growth and energy demand 
projections obtained from a macroeconomic model (MACRO). The framework operates 
on the level of 11 world-regions, and maps the entire energy system with all its 
interdependencies from resource extraction, imports and exports, conversion, transport 
and distribution to end-use services. Integration of agricultural and forest sectors in the 
MESSAGE-MACRO framework has been achieved through linkages to the DIMA and 
AEZ/BLS models. While, potentials for bioenergy supply and CO2 mitigation via forest 
sink enhancement are based on sensitivity analysis of the DIMA model, the AEZ/BLS 
framework provides important inputs with respect to agricultural drivers of GHG-
emissions, such as changes in rice cultivation, animal stock, and fertilizer use. In that 
sense, the MESSAGE-MACRO stands at the heart of the full integrated assessment 
framework. Its principal results comprise the estimation of technology specific multi-
sector response strategies for a range of alternative climate stabilization targets.  
A set of linkages between the models guarantee scenario consistency for a number of 
physical and financial scenario indicators. In particular, competition for land between 
food security, bioenergy, and afforestation/reforestation activities are geographically 
explicit. Consistency of land-cover changes is achieved through exchange of spatially 
explicit information between the agricultural framework (AEZ/BLS) and the forest 
management model (DIMA) for urban land, primary agricultural cropland, and forest 
areas. In addition, DIMA and AEZ/BLS are linked to MESSAGE. The data exchange 
includes costs, prices and quantities for forest sink enhancement, bioenergy supply as 
well as primary agricultural drivers of non-CO2 emissions. 
A typical scenario development cycle comprises four main steps, 1) the development of 
spatially explicit economic and demographic projections, 2) the estimation of spatially 
explicit, national and regional (dynamic) supply curves for forest sinks and bioenergy 
supply, and agriculture-related drivers of GHG emissions, 3) incorporation of this 
information into MESSAGE-MACRO model at the level of 11 world-regions, and 4) 
the development of multi-gas mitigation scenarios with MESSAGE-MACRO. The latter 
model identifies the appropriate portfolio of mitigation technologies, given a specific 
long-term climate target. The choice of the individual mitigation options across gases 
and sectors is driven by the relative economics of the abatement measures, assuming 
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full temporal and spatial flexibility, i.e. emission reduction measures are assumed to 
occur when and where they are cheapest to implement. For the intertemporal 
optimization, we use a discount rate of 5 percent throughout all of the calculations 
reported here. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: IIASA Integrated Assessment Modeling Framework 
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4 Summary of Scenario Results 
This section summarizes main scenario results with respect to the portfolio of mitigation 
measures and the contribution of individual options for achieving various levels of 
stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations. Our scenario set considers two 
principal dimensions of uncertainty – the uncertainty with respect to the development 
path (baseline uncertainty), and the uncertainty of the appropriate level of mitigation 
(stabilization level uncertainty). Each of these two dimensions has important 
implications for the absolute level and the timing of emissions abatement, as well as for 
the choice of individual mitigation options.  
Our analysis aims at the identification of measures that appear as robust choices given 
these uncertainties. For this purpose, we first explore the implications of baseline 
assumptions for achieving stabilization. Next we illustrate the contribution of various 
economic sectors as a function of the stringency of the stabilization level, and highlight 
important feedbacks in the forestry and agricultural sectors as response to mitigation. 
Finally, we will look more deeply into the technological options within individual 
sectors, their potential, and deployment over time. By doing so we address the following 
main questions: Which economic sectors are central in achieving stabilization of 
atmospheric concentrations, and which sectors gain importance at comparatively more 
stringent stabilization targets? Which technological options have the largest potential for 
emissions abatement and what technologies are robust against the baseline and target 
uncertainties? What options play an important role at higher marginal prices of carbon 
versus options that show significant contribution at modest carbon prices? What are the 
potential implication of stabilization for the forestry and agricultural sectors? And 
finally, what are the macroeconomic costs of stabilization given the wide range of 
alternative stabilization levels and baseline scenarios? 
We give first a brief introduction of emissions abatement options considered in our 
scenarios analysis, and move thereafter to the implications of baseline and target 
uncertainty on emission abatement efforts and options deployed. 
GHG mitigation options: 
The abatement of GHG emissions can be achieved through a wide portfolio of measures 
in the energy, industry, agricultural and forest sectors, the principal sources of emissions 
and thus global warming. Measures for reducing CO2 emissions range from structural 
changes of the energy system and replacement of carbon-intensive fossil fuels by 
cleaner alternatives (such as a switch from coal to natural gas, or the enhanced use of 
nuclear and renewable energy) to demand-side measures geared towards energy 
conservation and efficiency improvements. In addition, the capturing of carbon during 
energy conversion processes with subsequent storage in geological formations or the 
ocean (CCS) provide an “add-on” “end of pipe” approach for the decarbonization of 
fossil fuels allowing their continued use with low CO2 emissions to the atmosphere 
(Riahi et al., 2004). In addition, we consider in our analysis the novel concept of 
applying CCS to bioenergy conversion processes (e.g., during electricity or hydrogen 
production). Bioenergy in combination with CCS (BECS) permits - if the biomass is 
grown sustainably - the supply of energy at negative CO2 emissions (Obersteiner et al., 
2001): the carbon removed by plant growth from the atmosphere is captured and 
permanently stored (e.g. in geological formations) resulting in a net removal of carbon 
from the atmosphere (negative emissions). Another important option for CO2 emissions 
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reduction encompasses the enhancement of forest sinks through afforestation and 
reforestation activities (for a discussion see Rokityanskiy et al., forthcoming).  
In addition to options to reduce CO2 emissions, our analysis considers also the full 
basket of Non-CO2 gases. These gases comprise CH4, N2O and F-gases, which account 
together for about 40 percent of global warming since pre-industrial times (IPCC, 
2001). Sources of CH4 emissions include both, energy related ones like the extraction 
and transport of coal, natural gas, and oil, as well as non-energy related ones like 
livestock, municipal solid waste, manure management, rice cultivation, wastewater, and 
crop residue burning. The major source of N2O emissions are agricultural soils. To a 
smaller extent N2O emissions stem also from animal manure, sewage, industry, 
automobiles and biomass burning. Finally, F-gases are emitted predominantly from 
industrial sources. We consider bottom-up technology-based mitigation options for the 
majority of the above sources. For emissions sources with particularly large 
uncertainties, such as emissions from rice cultivation or agricultural soils we use more 
aggregated information given by regionally specific marginal abatement cost curves. 
For more details on mitigation technologies and the methodology used to derive cost 
estimates see Rao and Riahi, 2006.  
 
Baseline implications: 
Assumptions concerning the future development path in absence of climate policies, 
such as socio-economic, demographic, and technological developments have important 
implications on emissions. The resulting wide range in baseline emissions reflect these 
baseline uncertainties, ranging from high emissions in A2r to more intermediate levels 
B2, and relatively low levels of emissions in B1. The required emissions reductions for 
any given stabilization target strongly depends on the absolute level of the emissions in 
the baseline scenario. Similarly, the choice of the baseline scenario assumptions with 
respect to technology and productivity change have also major implications for 
feasibility and costs of mitigation options for any given stabilization level.  
The three panels of Figure 11 illustrate the contribution of main mitigation measures in 
the three different baseline scenarios for achieving stabilization of GHG concentrations 
at an illustrative level of 670 ppmv CO2-equivalent. The figure clearly shows the 
difference in the required mitigation efforts across the baseline scenarios that differs by 
about an order of magnitude, ranging from 160 GtC over the course of the 21st century 
in the B1 scenario to more than 1500 GtC in A2r. While the 670 ppmv stabilization is 
easily attainable in B1, and just modestly affects economic growth in B2 (see Figure 
16), it represents the most stringent target considered in our analysis for A2r. Yet lower 
stabilization targets appear - based on our modeling framework - technologically and 
economically unattainable in an A2r world. 
Renewable energy, including electricity and hydrogen production from solar, are the 
primary sources of emissions reductions in the B1 scenario.11 In that sense, in a B1 
world the stabilization at the 670 ppmv target is achieved primarily by adding “a bit 
more of the same” technologies as already included in the baseline. The main reason for 
this characteristic of the B1 stabilization scenario are the favorable technology 
                                                 
11
 For details on the possible deployment of hydrogen technologies based on B1 see Baretto et al., 2003. 
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assumptions that by scenario design were already incorporated into the B1 scenario 
baseline.  
In contrast, in the A2r scenario emissions have not only to be reduced more severely, 
but also require a wider portfolio of emissions reduction measures. The bulk of the 
emissions reductions in A2r are achieved through four main measures: energy 
conservation and efficiency improvements, nuclear, biomass (incl. CCS), and methane 
emissions reductions. High growth of population and thus increasing demand for 
agricultural products together with heavy reliance on coal explains the high emissions in 
the A2r scenario baseline and the corresponding vast CO2 and CH4 emission reductions 
in a A2r world. In addition, biomass and nuclear are seen as main complementary 
technological building blocks of a future, which predominantly relies on conventional 
technologies and the classical steam cycle. Demand-side measures play also a particular 
important role, since the increase of energy prices due to the stabilization constraint is 
most pronounced in A2r (see also subsection on costs below). 
The “dynamics-as-usual” assumptions of the intermediate B2 baseline scenario result in 
the most diversified and balanced mitigation portfolio. Stabilization is achieved through 
a combination of measures with similar contributions across the full basket of possible 
mitigation options. An exception are the mitigation of N2O and F-gases, which show 
comparatively small potentials for abatement across all three scenarios examined. 
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Figure 11: Contribution of main mitigation measures for the stabilization of CO2-equivalent 
concentrations at 670 ppmv. The different panels show the portfolio of reduction measures 
deployed in the A2r, B2, and B1 scenario respectively. 
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In the discussion thus far we have focused on a single stabilization level. Next we 
explore the implications for sectorial and gas-by-gas mitigation contributions across a 
wide range of stabilization targets.  
 
Target implications: 
The ensemble of stabilization scenarios analyzed in this paper comprises a wide range 
of GHG concentration targets, from very high stabilization levels at about 1400 ppmv 
down to 480 ppmv CO2-equivalent. The lowest stabilization target corresponds broadly 
to a stabilization of long-term “CO2 only” concentrations at slightly below present 
levels of 380 ppmv. Its temperature, radiative forcing, and concentration pathways 
depict a pattern of growth (short-term), “overshoot” (mid-term), and eventual reduction 
in the long-term. Such ambitious, low stabilization targets –even if corresponding to the 
official climate target of the European Union-- have thus far been little analyzed in the 
literature (notable exceptions are Azar et al., 2006; Van Vuuren et al., forthcoming; and 
Rao and Riahi, 2006).  
It is important to note that not all of the stabilization levels are attainable for each 
baseline scenario. While the B1 and B2 scenarios can each targets below 500 ppmv 
CO2-equivalent, although at significantly different costs (see discussion below), the 
lowest attainable stabilization target for A2r is about 670 ppmv CO2-equivalent. 
Unfavorable socio-economic conditions, including high population growth, the lack of 
economic and technological convergence between the industrialized and developing 
world, combined with relatively modest assumptions concerning technology 
improvements are the main factors limiting the feasibility of attaining very low 
stabilization targets in an A2r world. In contrast, the 670 ppmv CO2-equivalent target is 
the least stringent one for the B1 scenario, emphasizing again the importance of baseline 
scenario uncertainty or the merits of a “precautionary” development pathway of low 
emissions intensity that enlarges the flexibility and feasibility of attaining a wide range 
of climate stabilization targets.  
We use the two extreme tails of the possible distribution of development paths, A2r and 
B1, for exploring the implications of the target uncertainty for the portfolio of 
mitigation options. The stabilization scenario counterparts of these two baselines cover 
the full range of climate targets. While A2r is covering the upper part of the range from 
1400-670 ppmv CO2-equivalent, B1 explores the lower range of stabilization levels 
(670-480 ppmv CO2-equivalent).  
The contribution of individual sectors and gases as a function of the stabilization target 
and the baseline is illustrated in Figure 12. A number of robust trends can be deduced 
from our analysis: • First, the figure illustrates the dominant role of CO2 as the major source of GHG 
emissions and as target for emissions reductions across all baseline scenarios 
and stabilization targets. In both the A2r and B1 stabilization scenarios, the 
portfolio of measures for reducing CO2 emissions account for between 55 to 
more than 80 percent of the total GHG emissions abatement. While the relative 
importance of CO2 reductions for a specific stabilization level (see e.g., the 
overlapping 670 ppmv CO2-equivalent stabilization scenarios in Figure 12) is 
baseline dependent, there is nonetheless a distinct trend that the importance of 
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CO2 emissions reductions generally increases with the stringency of the 
stabilization level. By the same token, the importance of Non-CO2 gases is seen 
to be most significant at relatively modest stabilization targets. Our results 
confirm from a multiple baseline perspective similar findings by Hyman et al., 
2002 (that analyzed only a single baseline scenario, and put into questions 
claims (e.g. Hansen et al., 2000) that non-CO2 gases could solve the climate 
stabilization problem “without sweat”. • Second, our scenario results suggest that methane is the by far the most 
important non-CO2 gas. Across all stabilization scenarios methane management 
contributes at least as much to total emissions reductions as all other remaining 
non-CO2 gases combined. Like for other non-CO2 gases, the importance of CH4 
diminishes however, with the stringency of the target.  • Third, the most robust conclusion across all stabilization levels and baseline 
scenarios is the central role of emissions reductions in the energy & industry 
sectors. All stabilization scenarios concur that (independent of the baseline 
uncertainty) more than 80 percent of total emissions reduction would occur in 
these sectors. Thus the primary focus of any cost-effective mitigation strategy 
has to target the full basket of energy-related and industrial sources of CO2, CH4, 
and F-gases.  • Fourth, the agricultural and forest sectors are seen to contribute together between 
10 to 17 percent of total emissions reductions. The relative contribution of these 
sectors is strongly dependent on the scenario baseline. Due to a number of cheap 
mitigation options (e.g., methane reduction from rice cultivation and life-stock; 
De Angelo et al., 2006), emission reductions in the agricultural sector are 
important contributors in scenarios of relatively modest stabilization targets. In 
contrast, the forest sector gains in relative importance at more stringent 
stabilization levels and thus higher marginal prices of carbon.  
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Figure 12: Contribution of principal sectors and GHGs as a function of the stabilization target 
(A2r scenarios from 1400 to 670 ppmv CO2-equivalent, and B1 scenarios from 670 to 480 ppmv 
CO2-equivalent.).   
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Although the relative mitigation potential of the agro-forestry sector is more limited 
when compared to the energy and industry sectors, all sectors play an important role for 
meeting the respective stabilization target cost-effectively. Recent analysis using the 
MESSAGE-MACRO model (Rao and Riahi, 2006) indicate potential cost savings from 
the inclusion of non-CO2 gases and forest sinks in the order of 50 percent. Similarly, an 
international modeling comparison exercise (Energy Modeling Forum 22; Van Vuuren 
et al., 2006) estimate ranges of cost savings of such a “multi-gas” stabilization strategy 
across different models of between 25 to 70 percent when considering the marginal 
price of carbon and  of between 40 to 70 percent for the macroeconomic costs (GDP 
losses) of climate stabilization.12 
Results from our analysis indicate also that the implementation of climate policies may 
lead to fundamental changes in the economics of the agricultural and the forest sector. 
This concerns in particular new markets and business opportunities through additional 
revenues from afforestation and bioenergy activities in these sectors (e.g. through GHG 
permits). Expenditures in the bioenergy sector alone are estimated to increase to about 
300 billion US$ by 2100 (A2r baseline scenario - Table 5). The most stringent 
stabilization scenario would yield additional bioenergy expenditures of up to 450 billion 
US$ and 260 billion for sink enhancement activities (by 2100). This corresponds on 
aggregate to monetary flows into these sectors bigger than the present value of the 
global timber market or more than 50 percent of the present agricultural GDP. These 
additional revenues from agro-forestry climate mitigation efforts would also by far 
outweigh the costs of climate mitigation efforts in the agricultural sector (see Table 5, 
and for a discussion Fischer et al., forthcoming). 
 
 
Table 5: Economic indicators for agricultural and forest activities in the A2r baseline and 
stabilization scenarios 
(billion 1990US$ ) 2000
Bioenergy expenditures*
A2r 48
A2r-stab. 48 78 - 87 141 - 243 369 - 755
Sink enhancement costs
A2r 0
A2r-stab. 0 0 - 1 0 - 19 0 - 257
Timber market value
A2r 200
A2r-stab.** 200
Agricultural GHG mitigation costs
A2r 0
A2r-stab. 0 0 - 3 0 - 11 4 - 13
Agricultural GDP***
A2r 1273
A2r-stab.** 1273 1684 - 1684 2384 - 2386 3242 - 3254
* Including non-commercial energy accounted at 1$/EJ
**Values refer to an intermediate target of 670 ppmv Co2-eq.
0 0 0
3217
***Exclusive bioenergy. Data for 2100 are based on extrapolations from Fischer et al. (this Special Issue). Ranges for different climate scenarios 
from alternative GCMs (500-550 ppmv CO2 or approximately 670 ppmv CO2-eq.)
1684 2384
0 0 0
2100
29478 140
2020 2050
334 723 1318
337 743 1537
 
 
                                                 
12
 The studies explore costs for a central stabilization target of 4.5 W/m2, comparable to our 670 ppmv 
CO2-equivalent (or about 500 ppm CO2-only) concentration target. 
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Technology portfolios: 
Understanding the aggregated sectorial dynamics of emissions reductions requires to 
explore more deeply the underlying individual groups of mitigation technologies 
deployed. For this purpose we disaggregate our results into 10 selected technology 
clusters. We then compare the emissions reductions achieved by six principal measures 
for reducing CO2 in the energy sector with abatement measures through forest sink 
enhancement, and CH4, N2O and F-gases reduction measures.  
The cumulative contributions of these measures over the course of the century are 
illustrated in Figure 13. The individual measures are ranked from top to bottom 
according to their average contribution across the alternative baseline and stabilization 
level scenarios. Some technology clusters show pronounced differences across baseline 
scenarios, while others don’t. For example, while the contribution of nuclear is vast in 
the most stringent A2r stabilization scenario (equivalent to a reduction in cumulative 
carbon emissions of some 300 GtC), its deployment in the B1 is much more limited (35 
GtC). A mere ranking of the importance of individual mitigation options (technology 
clusters) according to just the average contribution across scenarios is therefore 
insufficient for assessing the robustness of a particular technological choice. We 
therefore introduce an additional indicator RF (robustness factor), which measures the 
ratio between the smallest and largest contribution for the most stringent stabilization 
scenario for each of the baselines (see Figure 13). The combination of the two 
indicators, the average contribution across all scenarios and the robustness factor (RF), 
is used for estimating the importance of any individual measure/technology within the 
overall mitigation portfolio. Nuclear for example combines a high ranking with respect 
to average contribution with a very low robustness factor (RF=0.1). This implies that 
although nuclear has a high potential for mitigation in some scenarios, it is not 
necessarily a robust choice if one takes into account all salient uncertainties (baseline 
and target uncertainty). 
An interesting finding from our analysis is that just one of the three top ranked 
mitigation measures has a robustness factor of above 0.5. Nuclear and demand-side 
measures (energy conservation and efficiency) are seen as mitigation measures with 
high potential but limited robustness as calculated by our “robustness factor”.13 
Biomass, in contrast, combines both a top ranking as well as a high calculated 
robustness factor (0.7), indicating its importance as part of the mitigation portfolio in 
the majority of the stabilization scenarios (irrespective of the baseline development path 
as well as the target uncertainty).  
                                                 
13
 For energy efficiency and conservation this conclusion reflects our scenario design and does not 
suggest that this option is not a “robust” one. As much of the potential energy conservation measures are 
already included in the B1 scenario baseline, little additional conservation is feasible in the respective 
mitigation scenarios, making this option seemingly less “robust”. An important area of future research 
will be to improve upon the definition of robustness factors in scenario analysis, including also 
deployment rates in baseline scenarios (e.g. by benchmarking all scenarios to a hypothetical static, 
calculatory baseline). 
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Figure 13: Cumulative contribution to emission reductions over the time horizon 2000-2100 by 
main mitigation measures (all stabilization levels and baseline scenarios) ranked according to 
their average contributions across all scenarios. RF denotes the robustness factor for individual 
measures.  
 
The importance of biomass in the mitigation portfolio across different scenarios is 
primarily due to its flexibility as a fuel. It can be used in combination with fossil fuels 
(co-firing with coal; Robinson et al., 2003) e.g. in the A2r scenario, as well as stand-
alone to produce electricity, hydrogen (Makihira et al. 2003) or liquid fuels (e.g., 
ethanol) as a substitute for oil-products in the transport sector in the B1 scenario. In 
addition to being a low-emissions alternative to fossil energy, biomass can also be 
combined with CCS (carbon capture and sequestration; Obersteiner et al., 2001). In the 
latter case the use of biomass would lead to net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere, or 
negative emissions. Thus, biomass combined with CSS plays the part of a classical 
“backstop” technology in our scenarios explaining its comparatively robust deployment 
across all stringent mitigation scenarios. Its robustness in the mitigation portfolio is 
therefore also a function of the (non-)availability of alternative “backstops” portraying 
similar features, but which were however not examined in the present study. 
Figure 14 shows the contribution of the three top-ranked mitigation measures as a 
function of the stabilization level in the A2r and B1 scenarios respectively. The share of 
biomass-based CCS technologies (BECS) in total biomass-related emissions reductions 
is shown in the upper panels. BECS contributes up to 100 GtC to the total cumulative 
emissions reduction in the most stringent stabilization scenarios (or on average 1GtC 
per year over the course of the century). Also apparent from the figure is the more 
limited role of the two other top-ranked measures (nuclear and demand-side 
management) in the B1 scenario. To a large extent this conclusion results from our 
scenario design. The B1 baseline incorporates assumptions of rapid energy intensity and 
37 
efficiency improvements. From the perspective of our mitigation modeling framework 
this is an “autonomous” process. The potential for additional mitigation induced by 
climate policy is limited as most of the efficiency and conservation potentials are 
already exhausted in the B1 scenario baseline. Similarly, the relatively low contribution 
of nuclear is due to the technology cost assumptions in B1, which tend to favor 
renewable alternatives.14  
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Figure 14: Cumulative contribution of top-ranked mitigation options (2000-2100) as a function 
of the stabilization target. Upper panels show biomass-related mitigation measures including the 
share of biomass-based carbon capture and storage (BECS). Lower panels give the contribution 
of nuclear and demand-side measures. A2r scenarios (left-hand panels) and B1 scenarios (right-
hand panels). Note that the low contribution of nuclear and conservation and efficiency 
measures in the B1 stabilization scenarios are to a large degree dependent on assumptions that 
                                                 
14
 A fuller scenario analysis on the respective uncertainty of the contribution of nuclear energy in a low 
demand, “high efficiency” scenario is provided in Nakicenovic et al., 1998. (Its C1 scenario is similar to 
the B1 scenario presented here; an alternative development including a higher nuclear contribution from a 
new generation of smaller scale modular reactor designs is outlined in scenario C2 in the Nakicenovic et 
al., 1998 study.) 
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define the B1 scenario baseline and that limit the potential contribution of these options in the 
stabilization scenario variants of the B1 baseline. 
A number of mitigation measures cluster in the mid-ranks of Figure 13 above, depicting 
average cumulative contributions well above 50 GtC over the course of the 21st century. 
These are in particular CH4 emisisons reductions, fossil CCS, non-biomass renewables 
(predominantly wind, solar and hydro), and forest sink enhancement. Most of these 
options (with exception of non-biomass renewables, which play a relatively minor role 
in the technologically cautious B2 scenario) generally share also a relatively high 
calculated robustness factors of above 0.3. These options are therefore important 
components of the mitigation portfolio explored in our scenario analysis.  
The smallest average contributions across the mitigation options are given for measures 
addressing N2O, F-gases and the substitution among fossil fuels (in particular the shift 
towards less carbon intensive natural gas). For N2O and F-gases, though, the RF values 
are the highest among all options. The result illustrates the pervasive use of these 
options in all mitigation cases, even with a comparatively very limited potential. 
Given the diversity of the results, and in particular the baseline scenario uncertainty, it is 
not possible to pick technological winners in a climate change constrained world. It is 
obvious from our analysis though that the prime target of mitigation measures are the 
energy and industry sectors. There is, however, less agreement as to which technologies 
will be the biggest contributors to future mitigation efforts.  
Timing of mitigation: 
So far we have discussed the cumulative contribution of individual mitigation measures 
over the course of the 21st century as an indicator for their aggregated emissions 
reduction potential. We now address issues related to timing.  
Structural changes of the economy, such as the replacement of the fossil-based energy 
infrastructure by less carbon-intensive alternatives is a slow process. Even in our most 
stringent stabilization scenarios it requires decades of forceful policy efforts before 
global CO2 emissions stop rising and eventually begin their declining trend in order to 
meet the respective stabilization target.  Reasons for this inertia are manifold. First, is 
the long-lived infrastructure of the energy system, with life-times in the order of 30 to 
50 years, which makes replacement of the existing capital stock a lengthy process as 
accelerated rates of change would require a (costly) pre-mature retiring of capital stock. 
Secondly, the diffusion process of new and advanced technologies itself, from early 
stages of innovation to niche market applications, and large-scale commercial use, 
requires considerable amount of time. Other intangible factors such as economic, 
institutional, and technological barriers add to this technology inertia. Most successful 
historical rates of energy technology diffusion are e.g. illustrated by the example of 
nuclear, which was heavily supported by government subsidies from its early onset. It 
took about 25 years from the first nuclear power installations in the 1950s to the 
widespread use of the technology in the late 1970s. Empirical studies note considerably 
longer diffusion times for other successful energy technologies in the past (Grubler, et 
al., 1999). 
Thus, many of today’s most advanced technological options, such as e.g., the 
production of hydrogen through solar (or nuclear) processes or the combination of 
biomass with carbon capture and storage (BECS) are seen in the majority of the 
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scenarios as long-term options, with significant contributions in the latter half of the 21st 
century only. Conversely, mitigation in the first 50 years is dominated by 
“conventional” technologies, which interact synergistically with existing infrastructures. 
Some notable examples are the switch to more efficient natural gas combined cycle 
power plants, energy conservation and efficiency improvements as well as the recovery 
of landfill methane with subsequent use for energy purposes.  
Figure 15 summarizes a number of selected technologies that show pronounced 
characteristics with respect to their timing. I.e., they share the same characteristics with 
regards to their contribution over time across the majority of the stabilization targets and 
baseline development paths.15 In the fossil sector the majority of the scenarios suggest 
early abatement through fuel switching to natural gas, and later over the course of the 
century carbon capture and sequestration from fossil fuels. A similar development can 
be observed for biomass, which is initially used as a substitute of fossil fuels, and just in 
the latter half of the century in combination with CCS emerges as an active carbon 
management option. It is also important to note that fossil-based CCS is generally 
deployed earlier in time in our scenarios than biomass-based CCS applications, 
reflecting their characteristic as “add-on” incremental technological innovation.  
 
 
Figure 15: Timing of selected mitigation technology clusters in the scenarios. 
                                                 
15 For identifying whether a technology is contributing at a specific point in time, we use a threshold of 5 
% of total annual mitigation or a share of 30 % of the mitigation potential of the respective technology 
cluster. This threshold has to be reached in the majority of all stabilization scenarios (for different targets) 
and at least in one stabilization scenario of each baseline. 
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A number of mitigation options play out as important elements of climate stabilization 
efforts throughout the entire century-long time scale of our scenarios. These are in 
particular the above mentioned demand-side measures and CH4 reductions from energy 
and landfills. In addition, industrial sources with mitigation potentials with low 
marginal costs, such as high efficiency catalytic reduction technologies in nitric acid 
production, also contribute to mitigation throughout the entire 21st century. 
Mitigation Costs: 
Figure 16 presents the development of costs for meeting alternative concentration 
stabilization targets based on the three scenario baselines (A2r, B1, and B2). We 
compute costs in terms of the loss of GDP by 2100 and the net present value of the 
energy system costs differences over the entire time period of our scenario 
simulations.16 Both indicators are used widely in climate policy analysis and both 
convey important information. Energy system costs depict the increase in investments 
and other expenditures in response to climate constraints in the prime sector of GHG 
emissions, while the loss in GDP accounts for corresponding impacts of mitigation costs 
on the whole economy. 
Costs generally increase with the stringency of the concentration target. Cost generally 
increase only modestly for meeting intermediate targets (relative to the baseline), but 
increase further almost exponentially when moving to the lowest attainable stabilization 
targets.  
Our analysis illustrates also the importance of baseline assumptions for future costs. The 
range of cumulative energy expenditures due to uncertainties with respect to the socio-
economic, demographic and in particular technological change in absence of climate 
policies is about 40.6 trillion in the B1 scenario, compared to more than 44.6 trillion in 
the most “expensive” A2r baseline scenario, i.e. some 4 trillion Dollars. The cost 
difference between the baseline scenarios is thus of similar magnitude as the cost impact 
of mitigation in order to attain the lowest possible stabilization level in the B1 scenario, 
where costs increase from 40.6 trillion in the unabated baseline to 44.3 trillion in the 
480 ppmv CO2-equivalent concentration stabilization scenario. By the same token, also 
the cost for meeting a specific stabilization target is highly baseline dependent – for 
example, the system costs for a 670 ppmv target correspond to 40.8 trillion US$ in B1, 
43.5 in Br, and 52.0 in A2r. Similarly, GDP losses for the 670 ppmv target show a wide 
range between almost zero (0.01%) in B1 and more than 4 percent (by 2100) in the case 
of A2r. 
We emphasize that the macroeconomic costs of climate mitigation are relatively 
modest, particularly compared to the scenario’s underlying economic growth 
assumptions. Even the highest losses of GDP by 2100 (between 4 to 4.5 percent; Figure 
16) would translate into a loss of just about two years of economic output, or in other 
words the stabilization scenarios would achieve similar levels of GDP as their 
corresponding baselines by 2102 instead of 2100.  
                                                 
16 For the net present value calculations we adopt a discount rate of 5 percent per year. 
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Figure 16: Net present value of energy system costs (2000-2100) and GDP losses (2100) for the 
three baseline scenarios and as a function of stabilization targets.  
 
5 Summary and Conclusions: 
Through our scenario analysis we have illustrated the importance of considering the two 
most fundamental uncertainties surrounding future efforts to mitigate against climate 
change: uncertainty of magnitude of future emission levels as described by alternative 
scenario baselines, and the uncertainty surrounding the ultimate mitigation target, i.e., 
the stabilization levels. Feasibility and costs, as well as technological options needed for 
meeting alternative climate stabilization goals all depend critically on these two types of 
uncertainties. Policy advice, ignoring these fundamental and inherent uncertainties in 
the climate change debate is therefore not only ill-placed but could be straightforward 
misleading. Our calculations once more confirm the value of considering uncertainties 
through a multi-scenario approach that while time consuming is nonetheless and 
indispensable tool for climate policy analysis. 
Consistent with the vast majority of the scenario literature, our analysis confirms that 
the costs for achieving climate stabilization increases with the stringency of the 
stabilization target. However, the costs of meeting a specific target are highly (baseline) 
scenario dependent. Long-term stabilization of GHG concentrations is order of 
magnitudes more costly under the relatively unfavorable socio-economic and 
technological development path that describes the “non-cooperative” A2r world 
compared to a scenario like B1, which is characterized by rapid global technology 
diffusion and transfer, and where achieving climate stabilization can build upon a 
favorable environment created through demand management, rapid capital turnover, and 
sustained high innovation especially in post-fossil technology alternatives. By the same 
token, stabilization targets significantly below 670 CO2-equivalent (500 ppmv “CO2 
only”) concentration are according to our calculations only attainable in the B1 and B2 
scenarios (but not in A2r). We thus conclude that the uncertainty of the baseline 
development path has stronger implications for feasibility and costs of mitigation than 
the choice of the long-term target itself. This suggests that policies aiming to influence 
scenario baselines in direction of low-carbon futures are a sensible hedging strategy 
given continued uncertainty about the ultimate target of climate stabilization levels, i.e. 
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continued uncertainty what ultimately may constitute a “dangerous interference with the 
climate system” in the parlance of the UNFCC. 
From all the variables involved in framing the fundamental uncertainties involved in the 
climate debate, technology emerges as a particularly important area worth further study. 
Not only is the influence of technological change of similar importance as demographic 
and economic development uncertainty (when analyzing its impacts on future 
emissions), it also represents a more “malleable” variable for directed policy 
interventions and hence should be of interest to climate policy making. Foremost, 
improved technology on a broad front (efficiency, conservation, cleaner fossil 
technologies, renewables, nuclear) not only could alleviate the problem “upfront” 
(through lower baseline emissions), but also widen available options for emissions 
reductions across a wide range of climate stabilization targets (as amply illustrated in 
the scenarios reported here). In addition, there is increasing evidence that the long-term 
costs of meeting various climate targets may ultimately be more a function of levels and 
types of climate policies and resulting changes in economic incentives than being 
inherent characteristics of potential mitigation technologies themselves. Such an 
“induced innovation” perspective (cf. the reviews contained in Clarke and Weyant, 
2002, Grubler et al., 2002, or Löschel, 2002) suggests that long-term costs of meeting a 
wide range of climate stabilization targets are uncertain. However this uncertainty is 
rather technologically “constructed” than given ex ante (for an illustration see 
Gritsevskyi and Nakicenovic, 2000). (Evidently short-term costs are much less 
uncertain. Many short-term mitigation measures inevitably entail the deployment of 
more expensive alternatives to “dirty” fossil fuels). This opens a challenging, but 
potentially most fruitful area of future research, i.e. to explore possible linkages and 
responses between environmental policies and the technological change these may 
induce. 
An important finding from our sectorial analysis is that the energy and industry sectors 
will play a central role for achieving drastic reductions in GHG emissions required for 
climate stabilization. The robustness of this finding is highlighted by our full ensemble 
of stabilization scenarios, in each of which about 85 percent of total mitigation is to be 
achieved in this sector. These reductions are cost-effective independent from the choice 
of the baseline development path, technology assumptions, economic growth or the 
ultimate stabilization target. It is therefore in the energy sector, where the question of 
induced technological change and an in-depth analysis of technological options, 
portfolios, and potential economic and environmental returns of improved technologies 
is of crucial importance. 
Agriculture and forestry play a less important role in emission reductions in absolute 
terms, but nonetheless are indispensable elements of a comprehensive and cost-effective 
mitigation portfolio. Emissions reductions from agricultural sources are comparatively 
important only at less stringent stabilization levels. Conversely, the forest sector gains in 
importance with the stringency of the target (and thus higher marginal GHG reduction 
costs).  
In our portfolio analysis we identified a limited number of technology clusters with 
particularly large cumulative emissions mitigation potentials over the course of the 21st 
century. The three top-ranked mitigation options comprise reductions through additional 
deployment of biomass, nuclear, and demand-side measures, such as enhanced energy 
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conservation and efficiency improvements. The issue of end-use efficiency is of 
particular importance as framing both scenario baselines as well as mitigation 
potentials. There are also important linkages between end-use efficiency improvements 
as for instance resulting from the deployment of advanced technologies such as fuel 
cells and corresponding structural changes in energy supply (e.g. hydrogen production 
from a variety of sources) that are accelerated in the mitigation scenarios. This suggests 
that a narrow focus on supply side mitigation options alone is likely to fall short to 
harness the full synergistic mitigation potential of new technologies that could result 
from integrating both energy end-use and supply aspects.  
From the perspective of energy supply options, those with the highest degrees of 
versatility in the production of a large variety of fuels suited for different end-use 
applications (gases, liquids, electricity) generally emerge as the most robust technology 
options: natural gas in the short-term (if available) and biomass in the long-term 
(however produced outside the traditional energy sector, i.e. in agriculture and forestry). 
Other renewables (solar, wind, hydropower) and nuclear are important mitigation 
options, however not across all scenarios. Their potential contribution is checked by 
energy conservation efforts (that limit the potential “demand” for these resources) as 
well by their integration into the overall energy systems architecture (that limits the 
potential for single purpose resources/technologies such as conventional “electricity 
only” nuclear or hydropower).  
Large scale carbon capture and sequestration (beyond forest sink enhancements) portray 
the classical features of a “backstop” technology. They are deployed on a massive scale 
only in unfavorable scenario baselines (e.g. the coal intensive scenario A2r) or in 
combination with stringent stabilization targets. Nonetheless, even if these options 
appear less robust across the entire ensemble of scenarios analyzed, their potential 
contribution in the more extreme scenarios is so large as to justify continued research 
and development of these options as a hedging strategy against unfavorable 
developments. 
We have also analyzed the timing of emissions abatement options and the deployment 
of individual technologies over time and identified measures that appear robust across a 
wide range of stabilization scenarios for both the short term as well as the long-term. 
The mitigation portfolios of our scenarios over the first 50 years are dominated by 
“conventional” technologies, which interact synergistically with existing infrastructures. 
For example, in the fossil sector the majority of the scenarios suggest early abatement 
through fuel switching to natural gas – and thus incremental changes of the present 
infrastructures. Later over the course of the 21st century carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) from fossil fuels becomes increasingly important, since it permits 
the continued use of these fuels at low emissions. A similar development can be 
observed for biomass, which is initially used as a substitute for fossil fuels, and just in 
the latter half of the century the combination with CCS emerges as an active carbon 
management option. It is also important to note that fossil-based CCS is generally 
deployed earlier in time in our scenarios than biomass-based CCS applications. The 
deployment of CCS measures is primarily driven by the increasing price of GHG 
reduction over time and the need of deep emissions cuts in the latter half of the century. 
Another important finding from our analysis is the large mitigation potential of 
biomass-based CCS systems, particularly for very low stabilization target levels, which 
suggests a useful avenue for further in-depth analysis of these technological options. 
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The short-term mitigation portfolios of the majority of the scenarios also comprises a 
number of cheap add-on options in the industry and non-CO2 sectors, such as the 
reduction of CH4 emissions from landfills and coal extraction, or emissions reductions 
in nitric and adipic acid production. These measures alone are however not sufficient for 
achieving climate stabilization, which requires in the long term fundamental structural 
changes of the energy system to less carbon-intensive technologies. There is thus no 
“silver bullet” for successfully solving the climate change challenge outside the energy 
sector. 
Finally, we conclude that the global macroeconomic costs of climate policies would be 
relatively modest, especially when compared to the scenario’s underlying economic 
growth assumptions. We emphasize though that the implication for different sectors 
could be very diverse ranging from boom (e.g. bioenergies) to bust (coal), but effects 
can be moderated by appropriate anticipatory technology development strategies (e.g. 
carbon capture and sequestration for coal). Climate policies may lead in particular to 
fundamental changes in the economics within the agricultural and the forest sectors. 
New markets and business opportunities through revenues from afforestation and 
bioenergy activities could emerge in these sectors (e.g. via GHG permits). The potential 
long-term market of these options could be of similar magnitude as the present global 
timber market or 50 percent of today’s agricultural GDP. Addressing climate change 
thus changes significantly both economic incentives as well as “the rules of the game” 
across all GHG intensive sectors of the economy, creating both opportunities as well as 
threats. This picture of potential loosers and winners from climate mitigation within and 
across sectors adds to the well-known picture of winners and loosers of climate change 
impacts across countries, sectors, and ecosystems. Reconciling these diverse 
perspectives and interests may ultimately be the greatest climate policy challenge. 
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